ECON2508 Financial Economics
University of Adelaide
26 May 2025

For an asset that delivers with certainty a payoff $ \(x_{t+1}\) tomorrow has a price of
\[ p_t = \underbrace{\frac{1}{1+r}}_{\text{pricing kernel}} x_{t+1}. \] with \(r\) the risk-free rate.
Under certainty all assets have the same rate of return \(r\).
| Bond | \(p_t\) | Face value |
|---|---|---|
| A | 956 | 1000 |
| B | 890 | 1000 |
Assume that there is a risk-free asset with a net return of \(r=0.05\).
| Bond | \(p_t\) | Face value | Net return |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | 956 | 1000 | 0.046 |
| B | 890 | 1000 | 0.12 |
With only two periods, a safe bond with return \(r\) and another safe asset with price tomorrow of \(p_2\),
\[ 1+r = \frac{p_2}{p_1} \]
The efficient market hypothesis states that the price of an asset reflects all available information.
| Bond | \(p_t\) | Face value |
|---|---|---|
| A | 956 | 1000+\(\color{blue}{\$150}\) |
| B | 890 | 1000 |
What would you do?
Buy A and in doing so you change its market price
\(r^{A}=1.203\) with \(r^{B}=1.124\)
The result is that the price of bond A would go up reflecting the new information
Malkiel (1989, p. 127)
“A capital market is said to be efficient if it fully and correctly reveals all available information in determining security prices.
Formally, the market is said to be efficient with respect to some information set, \(\phi\), if security prices would be unaffected by revealing that information to all participants. Moreover, efficiency with respect to an information set, \(\phi\), implies that it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of \(\phi\).”
\[ R_{i, t+1}= \Theta_{i t} + U_{i, t+1} \]
\[ R_{i, t+1}= \Theta_{i t} + U_{i, t+1} \]
Assessing the efficiency of the market requires a model that generate equilibrium returns \(\Theta_{i,t}\)
Even when we have such a model what do we include in the information set \(\phi\)?
Fama (1970)
“There is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.”
Michael Jensen (1978)

“Returns on speculative assets are nearly unforecastable; this fact is the basis of the most important argument in the oral tradition against a role for mass psychology in speculative markets.
One form of this argument claims that because real returns are nearly unforecastable, the real price of stocks is close to the intrinsic value, that is, the present value with constant discount rate of optimally forecasted future real dividends.
This argument… is one of the most remarkable errors in the history of economic thought.”
Robert J. Shiller

Modern markets show considerable micro efficiency (for the reason that the minority who spot aberrations from micro efficiency can make money from those occurrences and, in doing so, they tend to wipe out any persistent inefficiencies).
In no contradiction to the previous sentence, I had hypothesized considerable macro inefficiency, in the sense of long waves in the time series of aggregate indexes of security prices below and above various definitions of fundamental values.
Paul A. Samuelson

If new information about returns is released the behaviour of markets participants make that this information is quickly incorporated into prices
This information include scientific articles on asset price models!
In June 1983, Donald B. Keim published in the Journal of Financial Economics the article “Size-related anomalies and stock return seasonality: Further empirical evidence”
“Evidence is provided that daily abnormal return distributions in January have large means relative to the remaining eleven months, and that the relation between abnormal returns and size is always negative and more pronounced in January than in any other month” (…) ”Further, more than fifty percent of the January premium is attributable to large abnormal returns during the first week of trading in the year, particularly on the first trading day.”
Marc R. Reinganum in the same issue published “The anomalous stock market behavior of small firms in January: Empirical tests for tax-loss selling effects”

(2013 Economic Nobel laurates lecture)[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WzxZGvrpFu4]
ASSET PRICES AS A UTILITIY MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
With period-utility of the power form, \[ u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}-1}{1-\gamma} \]
with \(MU(c) = c^{-\gamma}\).
\[ \max_{I} U(c_1, c_2) = u (c_1)+ \delta u (c_2) \quad \text { subject to} \]
\[ \begin{align} c_1 &=y_1 - p_1 I \\ c_2 &= y_2 + x_2 I \end{align} \]
with \(y_t\) is the income or endowment in period \(t\) and \(x_2\) is the payoff of the asset in period 2.
Substituting into the ojective function we have \[ \max_{I} U(c_1, c_2) = u (y_1 - p_1 I)+ \delta u (y_2 + x_2 I) \] and we only need to find the \(I\) value that maximises this function
\[ \max_{I} U(c_1, c_2) = u (y_1 - p_1 I)+ \delta u (y_2 + x_2 I) \]
\[ \begin{align} \frac{\partial U}{\partial I} &= \text{MU}(c_1) (-p_1) + \delta \text{MU}(c_2) x_2 = 0 \\ \underbrace{ p_1 \text{MU}(c_1) }_{\text{Marginal cost}} &= \underbrace{ \delta x_2 \text{MU}(c_2) }_{\text{Marginal benefit}}. \end{align} \]
\[ \underbrace{ p_1 \text{MU}(c_1) }_{\text{\textcolor{red}{Marginal cost}}} = \underbrace{ \delta x_2 \text{MU}(c_2) }_{\text{\textcolor{blue}{Marginal benefit}}}. \]
Solving for the price in \(p_1 \text{MU}(c_1) = \delta x_2 \text{MU}(c_2).\) \[ p_1 = \underbrace{ \delta \frac{ \text{MU}(c_2) }{\text{MU}(c_1)} }_{\text{Discount factor}} x_2. \]
With period-utility of the power form \(MU(c) = c^{-\gamma}\),
\[ p_1 = \delta \left(\frac{c_{2}^{-\gamma}}{c_1^{-\gamma}}\right) x_{2} = \delta \left(\frac{c_{2}}{c_1}\right)^{-\gamma} x_{2} = \delta \frac{1}{\left(\frac{c_{2}}{c_1}\right)^{\gamma}} x_{2}. \]
\[ p_1 = \delta \frac{1}{\left(\frac{c_{2}}{c_1}\right)^{\gamma}} x_{2}. \]
\[ p_1 = \underbrace{ \delta \frac{ \text{MU}(c_2) }{\text{MU}(c_1)} }_{\text{Discount factor}} x_2. \]
With power utility \[ p_1 = \delta \frac{1}{\left(\frac{c_{2}}{c_1}\right)^{\gamma}} x_{2}. \]
Assume a bond that pays \(x_2 = 1\), then \[ 1+r \equiv \frac{p_2}{p_1} = \frac{x_2}{p_1} = \frac{1}{p_1} = \frac{1}{\delta \frac{ \text{MU}(c_2) }{\text{MU}(c_1)}} \]
\[ 1+r = \frac{1}{\delta} \left(\frac{ c_2 }{ c_1} \right)^{\gamma} \]
With power utility \(MU(c) = c^{-\gamma}\) \[ 1+r = \frac{1}{\delta} \left(\frac{ c_2 }{ c_1} \right)^{\gamma} \]
The risk-free rate is high when consumption growth is high
\(\color{blue}{\uparrow} c_2/c_1\), \(\uparrow 1+r\).
Alternatively, if \(1+r\) is high, the consumer consumes less today and saves more for tomorrow thus \(\uparrow c_2/c_1\).
\[ 1+r = \frac{1}{\delta} \left(\frac{ c_2 }{ c_1} \right)^{\gamma} \]
\[ \max_{I} U(c_1, c_2) = u (c_1)+ \delta \mathbb{E} u (c_2) \quad \text { subject to} \]
\[ \begin{align} c_1 &=y_1 - p_1 I \\ c_2 &= \mathbb{E}_1(\tilde{y_2}) + \mathbb{E}_1(\tilde{x_2}) I \end{align} \]
with condition for optimum \[ p_1 MU(c_1) = \delta \color{blue}{\mathbb{E}_1} [ x_2 MU(c_2) ] \]
\[ p_1 MU(c_1) = \delta \mathbb{E}_1 [ x_2 MU(c_2) ] \] solving for the price
\[ \begin{align} p_1 &= \frac{\delta \mathbb{E}_1 [ x_2 MU(c_2) ]}{ MU(c_1)} \\ p_1 &= \mathbb{E}_1 \left[ \delta \frac{ MU(c_2) }{ MU(c_1)} x_2 \right] \\ \end{align} \]
Let \(R_{i} \equiv \frac{x_{i,t}}{p_1}\) be the gross return on asset \(i\) between \(t=1\) and \(t=2\).
\[ 1 = \mathbb{E}\left(m_2 \frac{x_2}{p_1} \right) \]
\[ 1 = \mathbb{E}\left(m_2 R_i \right) \]
Ergo, \[ p_1 = \frac{1}{1+r} 1 \]
\[ p_1 = \mathbb{E}_1 \left( m_2 x_2 \right) = \mathbb{E}_1 \left( m_2 \right) 1 \]
\[ 1+r = \frac{1}{\mathbb{E}_{t=1} \left( m_{t=2} \right)} \]
Recall \(m_2 \equiv \delta \frac{ MU(c_2) }{ MU(c_1)}\)
With power utility \(MU(c) = c^{-\gamma}\) \[ 1+r = \frac{1}{ \delta \,\, }\mathbb{E}_{t=1} \left( \frac{ c_2 }{ c_1} \right)^{\gamma} \]
The risk-free depends on consumption growth \(c_2/c_1\)
\[ 1+r = \frac{1}{ \delta \,\, }\mathbb{E}_{t=1} \left( \frac{ c_2 }{ c_1} \right)^{\gamma} \]
\[ \ln (1+r) = \beta + \gamma \mathbb{E}_1 (\Delta \ln c_2) - \frac{1}{2} \gamma^2 \sigma_t^2 (\Delta \ln c_2) \]
\[ p_{i,1} = \mathbb{E}\left(\color{blue}{m_2} x_{i,2} \right) = \mathbb{E}(\color{blue}{m_2}) \mathbb{E}(x_{i,2}) + \operatorname{\mathbb{C}ov}(\color{blue}{m_2}, x_{i,2}) \] with \(\mathbb{E}(\color{blue}{m_2}) = 1/(1+r)\) \[ p_{i,1} = \frac{\mathbb{E}(x_{i,2})}{1+r} + \underbrace{\operatorname{\mathbb{C}ov}(\color{blue}{m_2}, x_{i,2})}_{\text{risk adjustment}} \]
\[ p_{i,1} = \frac{\mathbb{E}(x_{i,2})}{1+r} + \frac{\operatorname{\mathbb{C}ov} \left[ \delta MU(c_2), x_{i,2}) \right]}{MU(c_1)} \]
\(\color{blue}{\uparrow} c\), \(\color{red}{\downarrow} MU(c)\)
if \(\color{blue}{\uparrow} x_{i,2}\) when \(\color{blue}{\uparrow} c_2\) then
\(\color{red}{\downarrow} MU(c_2)\) when \(\color{blue}{\uparrow} x_{i,2}\) and the \(\operatorname{\mathbb{C}ov}<0\)
\(\color{red}{\downarrow} p_{i,1}\)
When the asset payoffs are positively correlated with consumption the investor values less this asset because it delivers when you don’t need it
\[ \sigma^2(c + Ix) = \sigma^2(c) + I^2 \sigma^2(x) + 2I \operatorname{\mathbb{C}ov}(c, x) \]
The price of the asset
\[ p_1 = \underbrace{ \delta \frac{ \text{MU}(c_2) }{\text{MU}(c_1)} }_{\text{Discount factor}} x_2. \]
With power utility:
\[ p_1 = \delta \frac{1}{\left(\frac{c_{2}}{c_1}\right)^{\gamma}} x_{2}. \]
Real interest rate with certain payoff and consumption growth
\[ 1+r = \frac{1}{ \delta} \left( \frac{ c_2 }{ c_1} \right)^{^{\gamma}} \]
The price of the asset in SDF from
\[ p_1 = \mathbb{E}_1 \left( m_2 x_2 \right) \]
Real interest rate with risky payoff
\[ 1+r = \frac{1}{\mathbb{E}_{t=1} \left( m_{t=2} \right)} \]
Risk premium is covariance with the SDF. With power utility
\[ p_{i,1} = \frac{\mathbb{E}(x_{i,2})}{1+r} + \frac{\operatorname{\mathbb{C}ov} \left[ \delta MU(c_2), x_{i,2}) \right]}{MU(c_1)} \]
Emiliano Carlevaro - University of Adelaide